Topic 5
Husserl’s Second Cartesian Meditation: Intentionality
Universal Structure of Experience

The bare identity of the "I am" is not the only thing given as indubitable in transcendental self-experience. Rather there extends through all the particular data of actual and possible self-experience even though they are not absolutely indubitable in respect of single details a universal apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego (for example, the immanent temporal form belonging to the stream of subjective processes) [p. 28].
Consciousness and Meaning

It must not be overlooked that epochē with respect to all worldly being does not at all change the fact that the manifold cogitationes relating to what is worldly bear this relation within themselves, that, e.g., the perception of this table still is, as it was before, precisely a perception of this table. In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such, regardless of what the rightful actuality-status of this objective such-and-such may be, and regardless of the circumstance that I, as standing in the transcendental attitude, abstain from acceptance of this object as well as from all my other natural acceptances. [...] Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, "means" something or other and bears in it itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cогitatum. Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion. The house-perception means a house - more precisely, as this individual house - and means it in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion peculiar to phantasy [pp. 32-33].
Intentionality

Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum [p. 33].
Reflection

Natural reflection alters the previously naïve subjective process quite essentially; this process loses its original mode, “straightforward” by the very fact that reflection makes an object out of what was previously a subjective process but not objective. The proper task of reflection, however, is not to repeat the original process, but to consider it and explicate what can be found in it. Naturally the transition to this considering yields a new intentional process, which, with its peculiarity of "relating back to the earlier process", is awareness, and perhaps evident awareness, of just that earlier process itself, and not some other. Precisely thereby an experiential knowing (which at first is descriptive) becomes possible, that experiential knowing to which we owe all conceivable cognizance and cognition of our intentional living. This continues to hold, then, for transcendental-phenomenological reflection. The reflecting Ego's non-participation in the “posing” (believing, taking a position as to being) that is part of the straightforward house-perception in no wise alters the fact that his reflecting experiencing is precisely an experiencing experiencing of the house-perception with all its moments, which belonged to it before and are continuing to take shape [p. 34].
The Disinterested Onlooker

If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world, experiencingly and otherwise, is called “interested” in the world, then the phenomenologically altered - and, as so altered, continually maintained - attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes himself as “disinterested onlooker”, above the naïvely interested Ego. That this takes place is then itself accessible by means of a new reflection, which, as transcendental, likewise demands the very same attitude of looking on “disinterestedly” - the Ego's sole remaining interest being to see and to describe adequately what he sees, purely as seen, as what is seen and seen in such and such a manner [p. 35].
Noematic and Noetic Description

Noematic descriptions, which concern the cogitatum as cogitatum, are: ‘descriptions of the intentional object as such, with regard to the determinations attributed to it in the modes of consciousness concerned, attributed furthermore with corresponding modalities, which stand out when attention is directed to them (For example: the “modalities of being”, like certainly being, possibly or presumably being, etc.; or the "subjective"- temporal modes, being present, past, or future)’ [p. 36].

Noetic description ‘concerns the modes of the cogito itself, the modes of consciousness (for example: perception, recollection, retention), with the modal differences inherent in them (for example: differences in clarity and distinctness)’ [p. 36].

‘Thus, when phenomenological reduction is consistently executed, there is left us, on the noetic side, the openly endless life of pure consciousness and, as its correlate on the noematic side, the meant world, purely as meant’ [p. 37].
Synthesis

The sort of combination uniting consciousness with consciousness can be characterized as *synthesis*, a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness. For example, if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection that "this" die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them "one and the same" is intended as appearing. [...] Looking straightforwardly, we have perhaps the one unchanging shape or color; in the reflective attitude, we have its manners of appearance (orientational, perspectival, and so forth), following one another in continuous sequence. Furthermore, each of these manners of appearance (for example: the shadowing forth of the shape or color) is itself an exhibition of the shape, the color, or whatever the feature is that appears in it. Thus each passing *cogito* intends its *cogitatum*, not with an undifferentiated blankness, but as a *cogito* with a describable structure of multiplicities, a structure having a quite definite noetic-noematic composition, which, by virtue of its essential nature, pertains to just this identical *cogitatum* [pp. 39-40].
If we consider the *fundamental form of synthesis*, namely *identification*, we encounter it first of all as an all-ruling, *passively* flowing synthesis, in the form of the *continuous consciousness of internal time*. Every subjective process has its internal temporality. If it is a conscious process in which (as in the perception of the die) a worldly Object appears as *cogitatum*, then we have to distinguish the *Objective temporality that appears* (for example: the temporality of this die) from the *"internal" temporality of the appearing* (for example: that of the die-perceiving). This appearing "flows away" with its temporal extents and phases, which, for their part, are continually changing appearances of the one identical die. Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of *cogitationes* (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a *connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness*, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as "the same" objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes *"constituted"* [pp. 41-42]
Being-in-Consciousness

... the one identical, appearing die (as appearing) is continuously "immanent" in the flowing consciousness, descriptively "in" it; as is likewise the attribute "one identical". This being-in-consciousness is a being-in of a completely unique kind: not a being-in-consciousness as a really intrinsic component part, but rather a being-in-it "ideally" as something intentional, something appearing or, equivalently stated, a being-in-it as its immanent "objective sense". The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself - and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness [p. 42].
Horizons

Every subjective process has [...] an intentional *horizon of reference* to *potentialities of consciousness* that belong to the process itself. For example, there belongs to every external perception its reference from the "*genuinely perceived*" sides of the object of perception to the sides "*also meant*" not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are "coming" now perceptually): a continuous *protention*, which, with each phase of the perception, has a new sense.

Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we *could* have, if we *actively directed* the course of perception otherwise [...] Moreover [...] to every perception there always belongs a *horizon of the past*, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections [...] up to the actual Now of perception. Everywhere in this connexion an "*I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing*” plays its part without detriment to the fact that this "*freedom*", like every other, is always open to possible hindrances. [pp. 44-45].
Horizonal Structure

We can ask any horizon what “lies in it”, we can explicate or unfold it, and "uncover" the potentialities of conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the objective sense meant implicitly in the actual cogito. [...] This sense [...] is never present to actual consciousness as a finished datum; it becomes "clarified" only through explication of the given horizon and the new horizons continuously awakened. The predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure.

For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already "construed" in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This leaving open, prior to further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the "horizon". As contrasted with mere clarification by means of anticipative "imaginings", there takes place, by means of an actually continuing perception, a fulfilling further determination (and perhaps determination as otherwise) but with new horizons of openness [p. 45].
The Object Pole

Thus, as consciousness of something, every consciousness has the essential property, not just of being somehow able to change into continually new modes of consciousness of the same object (which, throughout the unity of synthesis, is inherent in them as an identical objective sense), but of being able to do so according to indeed, only according to those horizon intentionalities. The object is, so to speak, a pole of identity, always meant expectantly as having a sense yet to be actualized; in every moment of consciousness it is an index, pointing to a noetic intentionality that pertains to it according to its sense, an intentionality that can be asked for and explicated [pp. 45-46].
The Universal Constitutive Synthesis

Any "Objective" object, *any object whatever* (even an immanent one), points *to a structure, within the transcendental ego, that is governed by a rule*. As something the ego objectivates, something of which he is conscious in any manner, the object indicates forthwith a universal rule governing *possible* other consciousnesses of it *as identical* - possible, as exemplifying essentially predelineated types. And naturally *the same is true of any "imaginable" object*, anything conceivable as something intended. [...] The allness of objects and types of objects conceivable for me transcendently speaking: for me as transcendental ego is *no chaos*; and correlative the allness of the types of the infinite multiplicities, the types corresponding to types of objects, is not a chaos either: noetically and noematically those multiplicities always belong together, in respect of their possible synthesis.

That indicates in advance a *universal constitutive synthesis*, in which all syntheses function together in a definitely ordered manner and in which therefore all actual and possible objectivities (as actual and possible for the transcendental ego), and correlative all actual and possible modes of consciousness of them, are embraced [pp. 53-54].