SECOND MEDITATION

THE FIELD OF TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCE LAID OPEN
IN RESPECT OF ITS UNIVERSAL STRUCTURES

§ 12. *The idea of a transcendental grounding of knowledge.*

Our meditations now require a further development, without which what has already been discovered cannot yield the right profit. As one who is meditating in the Cartesian manner, what can I do with the transcendental ego philosophically? Certainly his being is, for me, prior in the order of knowledge to all Objective being: In a certain sense he is the underlying basis on which all Objective cognition takes place. But can this priority rightly signify that the transcendental ego is, in the usual sense, the knowledge-basis on which all Objective knowledge is grounded? Not that we intend to abandon the great Cartesian thought of attempting to find in transcendental subjectivity the deepest grounding of all sciences and even of the being of an Objective world. If we were to abandon that thought, we should not be following Cartesian paths of meditation at all; our divergencies would be more than modifications prompted by criticism. But perhaps, with the Cartesian discovery of the transcendental ego, *a new idea of the grounding of knowledge* also becomes disclosed: the idea of it as a transcendental grounding. And indeed, instead of attempting to use *ego cogito* as an apodictically evident premise for arguments supposedly implying a transcendental subjectivity, we shall direct our attention to the fact that phenomenological epoché lays open (to me, the meditating philosopher) an *infinite realm of being of a new kind*, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience.¹

When we take it into consideration that, for each kind of actual experience and for each of its universal variant modes (perception, retention, recollection, etc.), there is a corresponding pure phantasy, an “as-if experience” with parallel modes (as-if

¹ Author’s marginal note: And where there is a new experience, a new science must arise.
perception, as-if retention, as-if recollection, etc.), we surmise that there is also an apriori science, which confines itself to the realm of pure possibility (pure imaginableness) and, instead of judging about actualities of transcendental being, judges about its apriori possibilities and thus at the same time prescribes rules a priori for actualities.1

But admittedly, when we let our thoughts hasten on in this manner, to the conception of a phenomenological science destined to become philosophy, we immediately run into the already-mentioned difficulties raised by the fundamental methodological demand for an apodictic evidence of the ego. For, as we have already seen,2 no matter how absolute the apodictic evidence of the ego’s existence may be for him, still it is not necessarily evidence for the existence of the manifold data of transcendental experience. On the other hand, though the cogitationes given to me, in the attitude that effects transcendental reduction, — given as perceived, recollected, or otherwise experience cognitions — must not yet be declared absolutely indubitable with respect to their present or past existence, still it may be possible to show that the absolute evidence of the ego sum does, after all, necessarily extend into those manifolds of self-experience in which the ego’s transcendental life and habitual properties are given, even if there are limits that define the range of these evidences (the evidences of recollection, retention, etc.). More precisely stated: The bare identity of the “I am” is not the only thing given as indubitable in transcendental self-experience. Rather there extends through all the particular data of actual and possible self-experience — even though they are not absolutely indubitable in respect of single details — a universal apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego (for example, the immanent temporal form belonging to the stream of subjective processes). Perhaps it can also be shown, as something dependent on that structure, and indeed as part of it, that the Ego is

1 Author’s later note: Ego [Ich] and habitualities are introduced for the first time in the Fourth Meditation [§§ 31 f.]. Consideration must be given to whether that is not too late. “Monad” [§33]. The concept of transcendental genesis [§34]? Introduction of the eidetic mode of observation [§34]. Why not before, at the very beginning of the Fourth Meditation or even earlier?

2 The phrase, “as we have already seen,” supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.
apodictically predelineated, for himself, as a concrete Ego existing with an individual content made up of subjective processes, abilities, and dispositions — horizontally predelineated as an experienceable object, accessible to a possible self-experience that can be perfected, and perhaps enriched, without limit.

§ 13. Necessity of at first excluding problems relating to the range covered by transcendental knowledge.

Actual demonstration that such is the case would be a great task, the task of a criticism of transcendental self-experience with respect to its particular interwoven forms and the total effect produced by the universal tissue of such forms. Obviously that task would belong to a higher stage, since it would presuppose that, first of all, we had followed the harmonious course of transcendental experiencing as it functions in a certain naïve manner, that we had made inquiries about its data and described them in respect of their universal properties.

The broadening of the Cartesian meditations, which was just now effected, will motivate our further procedure, as we aim at a philosophy in the Cartesian sense already described. We see in advance that the scientific efforts for which we found the collective name, transcendental phenomenology, must proceed in two stages.

In the first stage the realm accessible to transcendental self-experience (a tremendous realm, as we soon discover) must be explored — and, at first, with simple devotion to the evidence inherent in the harmonious flow of such experience, while questions pertaining to an ultimate criticism, intent on apodictic principles governing the range of evidence, are set aside. In this stage accordingly — a stage that is not yet philosophical in the full sense — we proceed like the natural scientist in his devotion to the evidence in which Nature is experienced, while for him, as an investigator of Nature, questions pertaining to a radical criticism of experience remain altogether outside the field of inquiry.

The second stage of phenomenological research would be precisely the criticism of transcendental experience and then the criticism of all transcendental cognition.

A science whose peculiar nature is unprecedented comes into our
field of vision: a science of concrete transcendental subjectivity, as given in actual and possible transcendental experience, a science that forms the extremest contrast to sciences in the hitherto accepted sense, positive, "Objective" sciences. Also among the Objective sciences there is indeed a science of subjectivity; but it is precisely the science of Objective subjectivity, the subjectivity of men and other animals, a subjectivity that is part of the world. / Now, however, we are envisaging a science that is, so to speak, absolutely subjective, whose thematic object exists whether or not the world exists. But more than this. Apparently my (the philosophizer's) transcendental ego is, and must be, not only its initial but its sole theme. Without doubt the sense of the transcendental reduction implies that, at the beginning, this science can posit nothing but the ego and what is included in the ego himself, with a horizon of undetermined determinability. Without doubt [it must at first parenthesize the distinction (evinced within the ego) between "me myself" with my life, my appearances, my acquired certainties of being, my abiding interests, etc., and others with their lives, their appearances, etc.; and thus, in a certain sense,] it begins accordingly as a pure egology and as a science that apparently condemns us to a solipsism, albeit a transcendental solipsism. As yet it is quite impossible to foresee how, for me in the attitude of reduction, other egos — not as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental egos — can become positable as existing and thus become equally legitimate themes of a phenomenological egology.

As beginning philosophers we must not let ourselves be frightened by such considerations. Perhaps reduction to the transcendental ego only seems to entail a permanently solipsistic science; whereas the consequential elaboration of this science, in accordance with its own sense, leads over to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity and, by means of this, to a universal transcendental philosophy. As a matter of fact, we shall see that, in a certain manner, a transcendental solipsism is only a subordinate stage philosophically; though, as such, it

1 Reading with Typescript C and the French translation. According to the published text: "with the noetic-noematic content".

2 Inserted later.
must first be delimited for purposes of method, in order that the problems of transcendental intersubjectivity, as problems belonging to a higher level, may be correctly stated and attacked. But, at this point in our meditations, we can make no definite decision about this matter; nor can the advance indications given here reveal their full significance before we have carried our meditations further.

At all events, a fundamentally essential deviation from the Cartesian course has been definitely indicated and will henceforth be decisive for all our meditating. Unlike Descartes, we shall plunge into the task of laying open the infinite field of transcendental experience. The Cartesian evidence — the evidence of the proposition, ego cogito, ego sum — remained barren because Descartes neglected, not only to clarify the pure sense of the method of transcendental epoché, but also to direct his attention to the fact that the ego can explicate himself ad infinitum and systematically, by means of transcendental experience, and therefore lies ready as a possible field of work. This field is completely unique and separate, since it indeed relates likewise to all the world and all the Objective sciences, yet does not presuppose acceptance of their existence, and since thereby it is separated from all these sciences, yet does not in any manner adjoin them.


We now shift the weight of transcendental evidence of the ego cogito (this word taken in the broadest Cartesian sense) from the identical ego to the manifold cogitationes, the flowing conscious life in which the identical Ego (mine, the meditator’s) lives — no matter what may define these expressions more particularly. (Meanwhile we understand questions about the range of the apodicticity of this evidence to be set aside.) To his conscious life — for example, his sensuously perceiving and imagining life, or his asserting, valuing, or willing life — the Ego can at any time direct his reflective regard; he can contemplate it and, in respect of its contents, explicate and describe it.

It would be much too great a mistake, if one said that to

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1 The last sentence of the preceding paragraph and this paragraph, as far as here, marked emphatically for deletion.
follow this line of research is nothing else than to make *psychological descriptions* based on purely internal experience, experience of one's own conscious life, and that naturally, to keep such descriptions pure, one must disregard everything psychophysical. A great mistake, because a *purely descriptive psychology of consciousness* (though its true method has become understandable and available only by virtue of the new phenomenology) is *not itself transcendental phenomenology* as we have defined the latter, in terms of the transcendental phenomenological reduction. To be sure, pure psychology of consciousness is a *precise parallel* to transcendental phenomenology of consciousness. Nevertheless the two must at first be kept strictly separate, since failure to distinguish them, which is characteristic of *transcendental psychologism*, makes a genuine philosophy impossible. We have here one of those seemingly trivial nuances / that make a decisive difference between right and wrong paths of philosophy. It must be continually borne in mind that all transcendental-phenomenological research is inseparable from undeviating observance of the transcendental reduction, which must not be confounded with the abstractive restricting of anthropological research to purely psychic life. Accordingly the difference between the sense of a psychological, and that of a transcendental-phenomenological, exploration of consciousness is immeasurably profound, though the contents to be described on the one hand and on the other can correspond. In the one case we have data belonging to the world, which is presupposed as existing — that is to say, data taken as psychic components of a man. In the other case the parallel data, with their like contents, are not taken in this manner, because the whole world, when one is in the phenomenological attitude, is not accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon.

If this psychologistic confusion is avoided, there remains another point of decisive importance (which moreover, with a corresponding change of attitude, is decisive also, in the realm of natural experience, for a genuine *psychology of consciousness*). It must not be overlooked that epoché with respect to all worldly being does not at all change the fact that the manifold *cognitiones* relating to what is worldly bear this relation *within themselves*, that, e.g., the perception of this table still is, as it
was before, precisely a perception of this table. In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such, regardless of what the rightful actuality-status of this objective such-and-such may be, and regardless of the circumstance that I, as standing in the transcendental attitude, abstain from acceptance of this object as well as from all my other natural acceptances. The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by adding one more member. Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, "means" something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum. Each does this, moreover, in its own fashion. The house-perception means a house — more precisely, as this individual house — and means it in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion peculiar to phantasy. A predicative judging about a house, which perhaps is "there" perceptually, means it in just the fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that supervenes means it in yet another fashion; and so forth. Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.1

§ 15. Natural and transcendental reflection.

For the sake of further clarification, however, it should be added that we must distinguish "straightforwardly" executed grasping perceiving, remembering, predicating, valuing, purposing, etc., from the reflections by means of which alone, as grasping acts belonging to a new level, the straightforward acts become accessible to us. Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in reflection do we "direct" ourselves to the perceiving itself and to its perceptual directedness to the house. In the "natural reflection" of everyday life, also however in that of psychological science (that is, in psychological experience of our own psychic

1 Author's marginal note: This needs supplementations. Start with intentionality in the pregnant sense, that of directing oneself to something; and so forth.
processes), we stand on the footing of the world already given as existing — as when, in everyday life, we assert: “I see a house there” or “I remember having heard this melody”. In transcendental-phenomenological reflection we deliver ourselves from this footing, by universal epoché with respect to the being or non-being of the world. The experience as thus modified, the transcendental experience, consists then, we can say, in our looking at and describing the particular transcendentally reduced cogito, but without participating, as reflective subjects, in the natural existence-positing that the originally straightforward perception (or other cogito) contains or that the Ego, as immersing himself straightforwardly in the world, actually executed. Therewith, to be sure, an essentially changed subjective process takes the place of the original one; accordingly it must be said that this reflection alters the original subjective process. But that is true of every reflection, including natural reflection. Natural reflection alters the previously naïve subjective process quite essentially; this process loses its original mode, “straightforward”, by the very fact that reflection makes an object out of what was previously a subjective process but not objective. The proper task of reflection, however, is not to repeat the original process, but to consider it and explicate what can be found in it. Naturally the transition to this considering yields a new intentional process, which, with its peculiarity of “relating back to the earlier process”, is awareness, and perhaps evident awareness, of just that earlier process itself, and not some other. Precisely thereby an experiential knowing (which at first is descriptive) becomes possible, that experiential knowing [Erfahrungswissen] to which we owe all conceivable cognizance [Kenntnis] and cognition [Erkenntnis] of our intentional living. This continues to hold, then, for transcendental-phenomenological reflection. The reflecting Ego’s non-participation in the “positing” (believing, taking a position as to being) that is part of the straightforward house-perception in no wise alters the fact that his reflecting experiencing is precisely an experiencing experiencing of the house-perception with all its moments, which belonged to it before and are continuing to take shape. And among these, in our example, are the moments of the perceiving itself, as the flowing subjective process, and the moments of the per-
ceived "house", purely as perceived. There is lacking neither, on the one side, the existence-positing (perceptual belief) in the mode of certainty, which is part of — normal — perceiving, nor, on the other side (that of the appearing house), the character of simple "factual existence". The non-participating, the abstaining, of the Ego who has the phenomenological attitude is his affair, not that of the perceiving he considers reflectively, nor that of the naturally perceiving Ego. We may add that it is itself accessible to an appropriate reflection; and only by means of this do we know anything about it.

We can describe the situation also on the following manner. If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world, experiencingly and otherwise, is called "interested" in the world, then the phenomenologically altered — and, as so altered, continually maintained — attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes himself as "disinterested onlooker", above the naively interested Ego. That this takes place is then itself accessible by means of a new reflection, which, as transcendental, likewise demands the very same attitude of looking on "disinterestedly" — the Ego's sole remaining interest being to see and to describe adequately what he sees, purely as seen, as what is seen and seen in such and such a manner.

Thus all occurrences of the life turned toward the world, with all their simple and founded posittings of being and with the correlative modes of being (such as certainly existing, / being possible, being probable, also being beautiful and being good, being useful, etc.), pure of all accompanying and expectant meanings on the observer's part, become accessible to description. Only in this purity, indeed, can they become themes of a universal criticism of consciousness, such as our aiming at a philosophy necessarily demands. We recall the radicalness of the Cartesian idea of philosophy, as the idea of the all-embracing science, grounded to the utmost and apodictically. This idea demands an absolute universal criticism, which, for its part, by abstention from all positions that already give anything existent, must first create for itself a universe of absolute freedom from prejudice. The universality of transcendental experience and description does this by inhibiting the universal "prejudice" of world-experience, which hiddenly pervades all naturalness (the
belief in the world, which pervades naturalness thoroughly and continuously), and then — within the sphere that remains unaffected, the absolute sphere of egological being, as the sphere of meanings reduced to an unalloyed freedom from prejudice — striving for a universal description. This description is then called on to be the foundation for a radical and universal criticism. Naturally everything depends on strictly preserving the absolute "unprejudicedness" of the description and thereby satisfying the principle of pure evidence, which we laid down in advance. That signifies restriction to the pure data of transcendental reflection, which therefore must be taken precisely as they are given in simple evidence, purely "intuitively", and always kept free from all interpretations that read into them more than is genuinely seen.

If we follow this methodological principle in the case of the dual topic, cogito — cogitatum (qua cogitatum), there become opened to us, first of all, the general descriptions to be made, always on the basis of particular cogitationes, with regard to each of the two correlative sides. Accordingly, on the one hand, descriptions of the intentional object as such, with regard to the determinations attributed to it in the modes of consciousness concerned, attributed furthermore with corresponding modalities, which stand out when attention is directed to them ¹. (For example: the "modalities of being", like certainly being, possibly or presumably being, etc.; or the "subjective"-temporal modes, being present, past, or future.) This line of description is called noematic. Its counterpart is noetic description, which concerns the modes of the cogito / itself, the modes of consciousness (for example: perception, recollection, retention), with the modal differences inherent in them (for example: differences in clarity and distinctness).

We now understand that, by our universal epoche with respect to the being or non-being of the world, we have not simply lost the world for phenomenology; we retain it, after all, qua cogitatum. And not only with respect to the particular realities that are meant (and as they are meant) in some set or other of separate acts of consciousness — or, stated more distinctly: that are meant selectively. For indeed their particularity is particularity

¹ Translator's note: In the text the pronoun is ambiguous.
within a unitary universe, which, even when we are directed to and grasping the particular, goes on "appearing" unitarily. In other words, there is always co-awareness of it, in the unity of a consciousness that can itself become a grasping consciousness, and often enough does. This consciousness is awareness of the world-whole in its own peculiar form, that of spatiotemporal endlessness. Throughout every change in consciousness the universe — changeable in its experienced (and otherwise selectively meant) particulars, but still the one and only universe — remains as the existing background of our whole natural life. Thus, when phenomenological reduction is consistently executed, there is left us, on the noetic side, the openly endless life of pure consciousness and, as its correlate on the noematic side, the meant world, purely as meant. Accordingly, not only in respect of particulars but also universally, the phenomenologically meditating Ego can become the "non-participant onlooker" at himself — including furthermore every Objectivity that "is" for him, and as it is for him. Obviously it can be said that, as an Ego in the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental Ego, but that I know about this only by executing phenomenological reduction. Only by virtue of this new attitude do I see that all the world, and therefore whatever exists naturally, exists for me only as accepted by me, with the sense it has for me at the time — that it exists for me only as cogitatum of my changing and, while changing, interconnected cogitationes; and I now accept it solely as that. Consequently I, the transcendental phenomenologist, have objects (singly or in universal complexes) as a theme for my universal descriptions: solely as the intentional correlates of modes of consciousness of them.

§ 16. Digression: Necessary beginning of both transcendental and "purely psychological" reflection with the ego cogito.

According to this account, the ego cogito of the transcendental ego, in the universality of his life, indicates an openly infinite multiplicity of particular concrete subjective processes, the uncovering and descriptive apprehension of which indicates, in turn, a first great domain of problems. Those processes are to be uncovered and described in respect of their varying (noetic and noematic) structures; likewise, on the other hand, in respect
of their modes of "combination" — at the highest level, in the unity of the concrete ego himself. The ego, naturally, is concrete only in the openly endless universality of his connectedly unitary intentional life and of the correlates involved in it as cogitata — correlates that, for their part, are united into integral universalities and include, in their number, the appearing world as appearing. The concrete ego himself is the universal theme of the description. Or, stated more distinctly: I, the meditating phenomenologist, set myself the all-embracing task of uncovering myself, in my full concreteness — that is, with all the intentional correlates that are included therein. As already mentioned, the parallel to this transcendental uncovering is the psychological uncovering of myself, i.e., my purely psychic being and, first of all, my psychic life, apperceived in the natural manner, namely as a component of my psychophysical (animal) reality and thus as a component of the world I naturally accept.

Manifestly a transcendental-descriptive egology, and likewise a descriptive "purely inner psychology" actually derived quite exclusively from internal experience (a psychology that, as the fundamental psychological discipline, must be developed), can start with nothing other than the ego cogito. What with the failure of all modern attempts to distinguish between a psychological and a philosophical theory of consciousness, this remark is of the greatest importance. Access to both theories is barred, if one is misled by the still all-prevailing tradition of sensualism and starts with a theory of sensation. To do so involves the following: In advance, as though this were obviously correct, one misinterprets conscious life as a complex of data of "external" and (at best) "internal sensuousness"; then one lets / form-qualities take care of combining such data into wholes. To get rid of "atomism", one adds the theory that the forms or configurations are founded on these data necessarily and the wholes are therefore prior in themselves to the parts. But, when descriptive theory of consciousness begins radically, it has before it no such data and wholes, except perhaps as prejudices. Its beginning is the pure — and, so to speak, still dumb — psychological experience, which now must be made to utter its own

1 Reading "psychologische" instead of "psychische" (psychic), as in both the published text and typescript C.
sense with no adulteration. The truly first utterance, however, is the Cartesian utterance of the *ego cogito* — for example: "I perceive — this house" or "I remember — a certain commotion in the street". And the first descriptive generality is the separation of *cogito* and *cogitatum qua cogitatum*. In what cases, and in what different significations of the phrase, data of sensation can then perhaps be tendered legitimately as components: that is <a problem whose solution is > a special result, to be produced by a work of uncovering and describing — from which the traditional theory of consciousness has completely exempted itself, to its own detriment. Since it was not clear about the fundamental essentials of method, it entirely missed not only the tremendous theme of describing *cogitata qua cogitata* but also the proper sense and particular tasks belonging to a description of *cogitationes* themselves, as modes of consciousness.

§ 17. The two-sidedness of inquiry into consciousness as an investigation of correlatives. Lines of description. Synthesis as the primal form belonging to consciousness.

On the other hand, if the beginning and the direction in which our tasks lie are clear from the first, they provide us, in our transcendental attitude, with important thoughts to guide the attack on further problems. Inquiry into consciousness concerns two sides (for the present we are leaving out of consideration the question of the identical Ego); they can be characterized descriptively as belonging together inseparably. The sort of combination uniting consciousness with consciousness can be characterized as *synthesis*, a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness. For example, if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection that "this" die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multi-form and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of / subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them "one and the same" is intended as appearing. The one identical die appears, now in "near appearances", now in "far appearances": in the changing modes of the Here and There, over
against an always co-intended, though perhaps unheeded, absolute Here (in my co-appearing organism). Furthermore, each continued manner of appearance in such a mode (for example: "the die here, in the near sphere") shows itself to be, in turn, the synthetic unity pertaining to a multiplicity of manners of appearance belonging to that mode. Thus the near-thing, as "the same", appears now from this "side", now from that; and the "visual perspectives" change — also, however, the other manners of appearance (tactual, acoustic, and so forth), as we can observe by turning our attention in the right direction. Then, if we pay particular heed to any of the die's features that shows itself in the die-perception (for example: the die's shape or color, or one of its faces in particular, or the square shape or particular color of that face), the same is again the case. Always we find the feature in question as a unity belonging to a passing flow of "multiplicities". Looking straightforwardly, we have perhaps the one unchanging shape or color; in the reflective attitude, we have its manners of appearance (orientational, perspectival, and so forth), following one another in continuous sequence. Furthermore, each of these manners of appearance (for example: the shadowing forth [Abschattung] of the shape or color) is itself an exhibition of [Darstellung von] the shape, the color, or whatever the feature is that appears in it. Thus each passing cogito intends its cogitatum, not with an undifferentiated blankness, but as a cogito with a describable structure of multiplicities, a structure having a quite definite noetic-noematic composition, which, by virtue of its essential nature, pertains to just this identical cogitatum.

Parallel and (as becomes apparent in making them) extremely far-reaching descriptions can be developed in the case of any intuition — that is, not only in the case of sensuous perception, but also in the case of other modes of intuition (recollection, which makes intuited afterwards; expectation, which makes intuited beforehand). For example: the remembered physical thing also appears "in" changing sides, perspectives, and so forth. But, in order to do justice to the differences among modes of intuition (for example: to what differentiates givenness in memory / from givenness in perception), other dimensions would have to be described. One most general trait, however, is always
present in any consciousness of any sort, as consciousness of something: This something, the particular "intentional object qua intentional" in any consciousness, is there [bewusst] as an identical unity belonging to noetically-noematically changing modes of consciousness, whether intuitive or non-intuitive.

Once we have laid hold of the phenomenological task of describing consciousness concretely, veritable infinities of facts — never explored prior to phenomenology — become disclosed. They can all be characterized as facts of synthetic structure, which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes, in themselves (as concrete synthetic wholes) and in relation to one another. Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of — that is to say, Franz Brentano’s significant discovery that "intentionality" is the fundamental characteristic of "psychic phenomena" — and actually lays open the method for a descriptive transcendental-philosophical theory of consciousness (and naturally also for a corresponding psychological theory).

§ 18. Identification as the fundamental form of synthesis. The all-embracing synthesis of transcendental time.

If we consider the fundamental form of synthesis, namely identification, we encounter it first of all as an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous consciousness of internal time. Every subjective process has its internal temporality. If it is a conscious process in which (as in the perception of the die) a worldly Object appears as cogitatum, then we have to distinguish the Objective temporality that appears (for example: the temporality of this die) from the "internal" temporality of the appearing (for example: that of the die-perceiving). This appearing "flows away" with its temporal extents and phases, which, for their part, are continually changing appearances of the one identical die. Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as "the same" objectivity / belonging
to multiple modes of appearance, becomes "constituted". The existence of a world and, accordingly, the existence of this die are "parenthesized" in consequence of my epoché; but the one identical, appearing die (as appearing)\(^1\) is continuously "immanent" in the flowing consciousness, descriptively "in" it; as is likewise the attribute "one identical". This being-in-consciousness is a being-in of a completely unique kind: not a being-in-consciousness as a really intrinsic component part, but rather a being-in-it "ideally" as something intentional, something appearing — or, equivalently stated, a being-in-it as its immanent "objective sense". The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself — and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.

Now the same die (the same for consciousness) can be intended in highly diverse modes of consciousness — simultaneously, or else successively in separated modes of consciousness — for example: in separate perceptions, recollections, expectations, valuations, and so forth. Again it is a synthesis that, as a unitary consciousness embracing these separated processes, gives rise to the consciousness of identity and thereby makes any knowing of identity possible.

But likewise every consciousness in which the non-identical is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality, a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex, or whatever it is) synthetically or, as is also said here, syntactically — regardless, moreover, of whether this synthesis should be characterized as a pure passivity on the Ego's part or as his activity. Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of "syntheses" (to be sure, syntheses of another kind).

Synthesis, however, does not occur just in every particular conscious process, nor does it connect one particular conscious process with another only occasionally. On the contrary, as we said beforehand, the whole of conscious life is unified synthetically. Conscious life is therefore an all-embracing "cogito", syn-

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\(^1\) Supplied in accordance with Typescript C.
thetically comprising all particular conscious processes that ever become prominent, and having its all-embracing cogitatum, founded at different levels on the manifold particular cogitata. But this founding does not signify a building up in the temporal / sequence of a genesis, since indeed any imaginable particular subjective process is only a prominence within a total consciousness always presupposed as unitary. The all-embracing cogitatum <of reflection> is the all-embracing life itself, with its openly endless unity and wholeness. Only because it already appears as a total unity can it also be “contemplated”, in the pre-eminent manner characterizing acts of paying attention and grasping, and be made the theme for an all-embracing cognition. The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing consciousness of internal time. The correlate of this consciousness is immanent temporality itself, in conformity with which all the life-processes belonging to the ego that can ever be found reflectively must present themselves as temporally ordered, temporally beginning and ending, simultaneous or successive, within the constant infinite horizon: immanent time. The distinction between <internal > time itself and the consciousness of <internal > time can be expressed also as that between the subjective process in internal time, or the temporal form of this process, and the modes of its temporal appearance, as the corresponding “multiplicities”. As these modes of appearance, which make up the consciousness of internal time, are themselves “intuitive components of conscious life” [“intentionale Erlebnisse”] and must in turn be given in reflection as temporalities, we encounter here a paradoxical fundamental property of conscious life, which seems thus to be infected with an infinite regress. The task of clarifying this fact and making it understandable presents extraordinary difficulties. Be that as it may, the fact is evident, even apodictically evident, and indicates one aspect of the ego’s marvellous being-for-himself: here, in the first place, the being of his conscious life in the form of reflexive intentional relatedness to itself.

1 Author’s marginal note: All this requires further supplementation, relating to the consciousness (within the ego) of intersubjective time.
§ 19. Actuality and potentiality of intentional life.

The multiplicity of the intentionality belonging to any cogito — to any that relates to the world, by the very fact that such a cogito not only intends something wordly but is itself intended in the consciousness of internal time — is a theme not exhausted with the consideration of cogitationes¹ as actual subjective processes. On the contrary, every actuality involves its potentialities, which are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities / intentionally predelineated in respect of content — namely, in the actual subjective process itself — and, in addition, having the character of possibilities actualizable by the Ego.

With that, another fundamental trait of intentionality is indicated. Every subjective process has a process² "horizon", which changes with the alteration of the nexus of consciousness to which the process belongs and with the alteration of the process itself from phase to phase of its flow — an intentional horizon of reference to potentialities of consciousness that belong to the process itself. For example, there belongs to every external perception its reference from the "genuinely perceived" sides of the object of perception to the sides "also meant" — not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are "coming" now perceptually): a continuous protention, which, with each phase of the perception, has a new sense. Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth. In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I could have seen others — naturally, if I had directed my perceptual activity in a suitably different manner. Moreover, as might have been said earlier, to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible

¹ In the published text, Typescript C, and the French translation: cogitata.
² Inserted later.
recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception. Everywhere in this connexion an “I can and do, but I can also do otherwise than I am doing” plays its part — without detriment to the fact that this “freedom”, like every other, is always open to possible hindrances.

The horizons are “predelineated” potentialities. We say also: We can ask any horizon what “lies in it”, we can explicate or unfold it, and “uncover” the potentialities of conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the objective sense meant implicitly in the actual cogito, though never with more than a certain degree of foreshadowing. This sense, the cogitatum qua cogitatum, is never present to actual consciousness [vorstellig] as a finished datum; it becomes “clarified” only through explication of the given horizon and the new / horizons continuously awakened [der stetig neu geweckten Horizonten]. The predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure. For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already “construed” in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This leaving open, prior to further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the “horizon”. As contrasted with mere ¹ clarification by means of anticipative “imaginings”, there takes place, by means of an actually continuing perception, a fulfilling further determination (and perhaps determination as otherwise) — but with new horizons of openness.

Thus, as consciousness of something, every consciousness has the essential property, not just of being somehow able to change into continually new modes of consciousness of the same object (which, throughout the unity of synthesis, is inherent in them as an identical objective sense), but of being able to do so according to — indeed, only according to those horizon intentionalities ². The object is, so to speak, a pole of identity, always meant

¹ Reading, with Typescript C, “blossen” instead of “grossen”. Cf. the French: “simple”.
² Reading, with Typescript C, “-intentionalitäten”, instead of “-intentionalitäten".
expectantly as having a sense yet to be actualized; in every moment of consciousness it is an index, pointing to a noetic intentionality that pertains to it according to its sense, an intentionality that can be asked for and explicated. All this is concretely accessible to investigation.

§ 20. *The peculiar nature of intentional analysis.*

It becomes evident that, as intentional, the analysis of consciousness is totally different from analysis in the usual and natural sense. Conscious life, as we said once before, is not just a whole made up of "data" of consciousness and therefore "analyzable" (in an extremely broad sense, divisible) merely into its self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient elements — the forms of unity (the "form-qualities") being included then among the non-self-sufficient elements. To be sure, when regard is directed to certain themes, intentional "analysis" does lead also to such divisions, and to that extent the word can still serve in the original sense; but everywhere its peculiar attainment (as "intentional") is an uncovering of the potentialities "implicit" in actualities of consciousness — an uncovering that brings about, on the noematic side, an / "explication" or "unfolding", a "becoming distinct" and perhaps a "clearing" of what is consciously meant (the objective sense) and, correlatively, an explication of the potential intentional processes themselves. Intentional analysis is guided by the fundamental cognition that, as a consciousness, every cogito is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of its meant *[Meinung seines Gemeinten]*, but that, at any moment, this something meant *[dieses Vermeinte]* is more — something meant with something more — than what is meant at that moment "explicitly". In our example, each phase of perception was a mere side of "the" object, as what was perceptually meant. This *intending-beyond-itself*, which is implicit in any consciousness, must be considered an essential moment of it. That, on the other hand, this intending is, and must be, a "meaning more" of the Same becomes shown only by the evidence of a possible making distinct and, ultimately, of an intuitive uncovering, in the form of actual and possible continued perceiving or of possible recollecting, as something to be done on my initiative.
The phenomenologist, however, does not inquire with merely a naïve devotedness to the intentional object purely as such; he does not consider the intentional object only straightforwardly and explicate its meant features, its meant parts and properties. If that were all he did, the intentionality, which makes up the intuitive or non-intuitive consciousness itself and the explicative considering, would remain "anonymous". In other words: There would remain hidden the noetic multiplicities of consciousness and their synthetic unity, by virtue of which alone, and as their essentially necessary unitary doing [ihre wesensmässige Einheitsleistung], we have one intentional object, and always this definite one, continuously meant — have it, so to speak, before us as meant thus and so; likewise the hidden constitutive performances by virtue of which (if consideration then continues as explication) we find straightforwardly, as explicata of what is meant, such things as a "feature", a "property" 1 a "part", or mean these implicitly and can then discover them intuitively. When the phenomenologist explores everything objective, and whatever can be found in it, exclusively as a "correlate of consciousness", he does not consider and describe it only straightforwardly and only as somehow related back to the corresponding Ego and the ego cogito of which it is the cogitatum. Rather, with his reflective regard, he penetrates the anonymous "cogitative" life, he uncovers the definite synthetic courses of the manifold modes of consciousness and, further back, the modes of Ego-comportment, which make understandable the objective affair's simple meantness for the Ego, its intuitive or non-intuitive meantness. Or, stated more precisely, they make it understandable how, in itself and by virtue of its current intentional structure, consciousness makes possible and necessary the fact that such an "existing" and "thus determined" Object is intended in it, occurs in it as such a sense. Thus, in the case of perception of a spatial thing, the phenomenologist (abstracting at first from all "significance" predicates and restricting himself purely to the "res extensa") explores the manner in which the changing "sight things", and "things" of the other senses, have in themselves the character of appearances of this same res

Author's marginal note: substratum.
extensa. In the case of any spatial thing, he explores its \(^1\) (potential and perhaps actual) changing perspectives; furthermore, with regard to its temporal modes of givenness, the modifications of its being still intended while it sinks retentionally into the past and, with respect to the Ego, the modes of his specifically own still-having and holding, the modes of attention, and so forth. It is to be noted in this connexion that phenomenological explication of the perceived as such is not restricted to that perceptual explication of it, in respect of its features, which comes about as perception continues. On the contrary, phenomenological explication makes clear what is included and only non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum (for example, the "other side"), by making present in phantasy the potential perceptions that would make the invisible visible. That is true of any intentional analysis. As intentional it reaches out beyond the isolated subjective processes that are to be analyzed. By explicating their correlative horizons, it brings the highly diverse anonymous processes into the field comprising those that function "constitutively" in relation to the objective sense of the cogitatum in question — that is to say: not only the actual but also the potential subjective processes, which, as such, are "implicit" and "predelineated" in the sense-producing intentionality of the actual ones and which, when discovered, have the evident character of processes that explicate the implicit sense. Thus alone can the phenomenologist make understandable to himself how, within the immanency of conscious life and in thus and so determined modes of consciousness belonging to this incessant flux, anything like fixed and abiding objective unities can become intended and, in particular, how this marvellous work of "constituting" identical objects is done in the case of each category of objects / — that is to say: how, in the case of each category, the constitutive conscious life looks, and must look, in respect of the correlative noetic and noematic variants pertaining to the same object. The horizon structure belonging to every intentionality thus prescribes for phenomenological analysis and description methods of a totally new kind, which come into action wherever consciousness and object, wherever intending and sense, real and ideal actuality, possi-

\(^1\) Reading, with Typescript C, "ihre" instead of "ihrer".
bility, necessity, illusion, truth, and, on the other hand, experience, judgment, evidence, and so forth, present themselves as names for transcendental problems, to be taken in hand as genuine problems concerning "subjective origins".

Mutatis mutandis the same is manifestly true in the case of a pure "internal psychology" or a "purely intentional" psychology (within the realm of natural positivity) \(^1\), which we have alluded to as the parallel to constitutional transcendental phenomenology. The only radical reform of psychology consists in the pure development of an intentional psychology. Brentano demanded it; but unfortunately he failed to recognize the fundamental sense of an intentional analysis and therefore failed to recognize the method that alone makes such a psychology possible, as the latter can gain access to its genuine and truly infinite field of problems only by that method.

At first, to be sure, the possibility of a pure phenomenology of consciousness seems highly questionable, since the realm of phenomena of consciousness is so truly the realm of a Heraclitean flux. It would in fact be hopeless to attempt to proceed here with such methods of concept and judgment formation as are standard in the Objective sciences. The attempt to determine a process of consciousness as an identical object, on the basis of experience, in the same fashion as a natural Object — ultimately then with the ideal presumption of a possible explication into identical elements, which might be apprehended by means of fixed concepts — would indeed be folly. Processes of consciousness — not merely owing to our imperfect ability to know objects of that kind, but a priori — have no ultimate elements and relationships, fit for subsumption under the idea of objects determinable by fixed concepts and therefore such that, in their case, it would be rational to set ourselves the task of an approximative determination guided by fixed concepts. In spite of that, however, the idea of an intentional analysis is legitimate, since, in the flux of intentional synthesis (which creates unity in all consciousness and which, noetically and noematically, constitutes unity of objective sense), an essentially necessary conformity to type prevails and can be apprehended in strict concepts. \(^2\)

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\(^1\) Supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

\(^2\) Supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.
§ 21. The intentional object as "transcendental clue".

1 The most universal type — within which, as a form, everything particular is included — is indicated by our first universal scheme: ego — cogito — cogitatum. The most universal descriptions (made with the most extreme, with — so to speak — formal, universality), which we have attempted in a rough fashion concerning intentionality, concerning its peculiar synthesis, and so forth, relate to that type. In the particularization of that type, and of its description, the intentional object (on the side belonging to the cogitatum) plays, for easily understood reasons, the role of "transcendental clue" to the typical infinite multiplicities of possible cogitationes that, in a possible synthesis, bear the intentional object within them (in the manner peculiar to consciousness) as the same meant object. Necessarily the point of departure is the object given "straightforwardly" at the particular time. From it reflection goes back to the mode of consciousness at that time and to the potential modes of consciousness included horizontally in that mode, then to those in which the object might be otherwise intended as the same, within the unity (ultimately) of a possible conscious life, all the possibilities of which are included in the "ego". If we continue to limit ourselves to the most extreme universality, to formal universality, if we think of just any object (with an unrestrictedly optional content) as cogitatum, and take it in this universality as our clue, we find that the multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness of the Same — the formal type that all these exemplify — is subdivided into a number of sharply differentiated particular types. For example, possible perception, retention, recollection, expectation, intending as something symbolized, intuitive representation by analogy, are such types of intentionality, which pertain to any conceivable object, as do their types of synthetic combination. All these types become further particularized in their whole noetic-noematic composition as soon as we particularize the empty universality of the intentional object. The particularization may at first be formal-logical (formal-ontological) — that is to say: modes of the Anything

1 Author's note opposite first line of text: Intentional modifications of the cogito — memories and empathies.
Whatever, such as single object, and ultimately individual object, universal, plurality, whole, predicatively formed state (or complex) of affairs, relational complex, and so forth. Here the radical difference between objectivities that are real (in a broad sense) and categorial objectivities also presents itself. The latter point back to an origin from "operations", from a step-by-step generative-constructive / activity of the ego: the former, to an origin as effects of a merely passive (in any case, not an <actively> generative) synthesis. On the other hand, we have the material-ontological particularizations, starting from the concept of the real concrete individual, which is differentiated into its real regions — for example: (mere) spatial thing, animate being, and so forth — and entails corresponding particularizations of the relevant formal-logical modifications (real property, real plurality, real relational complex, and the rest).

Each type brought out by these clues is to be asked about its noetic-noematic structure, is to be systematically explicated and established in respect of those modes of intentional flux that pertain to it, and in respect of their horizons and the intentional processes implicit in their horizons, and so forth. If one keeps no matter what object fixed in its form or category and maintains continuous evidence of its identity throughout the change in modes of consciousness of it, one sees that, no matter how fluid these may be, and no matter how inapprehensible as having ultimate elements, still they are by no means variable without restriction. They are always restricted to a set of structural types, which is "invariable", inviolably the same: as long as the objectivity remains intended as this one and as of this kind, and as long as, throughout the change in modes of consciousness, evidence of objective identity can persist.

To explicate systematically just this set of structural types is the task of transcendental theory, which, if it restricts itself to an objective universality as its clue, is called theory of the transcendental constitution of any object whatever, as an object of the form or category (highest of all, the region) in question. Thus arise — first of all, as separate — many different transcendental theories: a theory of perception and the other types of intuition, a theory of intending objects as symbolized, a theory of judgment, a theory of volition, and so forth. They become united, however,
in view of the more comprehensive synthetic complexes; they belong together functionally, and thus make up the \textit{formally universal} constitutional theory of \textit{any object whatever} or of an open horizon of possible \textit{objects of any sort}, as objects of possible consciousness.

Furthermore, transcendental \textit{/} theories of constitution arise that, as non-formal, relate to any spatial things whatever (singly and in the all-embracing nexus of a Nature), to any psycho-physical beings, to human beings as such, to their self-comportment toward their natural and otherwise determined surrounding world, to any social communities, any cultural objects, and ultimately to any Objective world whatever — purely as a world intended in possible consciousness and, transcendently, as a world constituted (in the manner peculiar to consciousness) purely within the transcendental ego. All of that, naturally, with consistently exercised transcendental epoché, from which all these theories derive a transcendental sense.\textsuperscript{1}

Yet it must not be overlooked that types of real and ideal objects intended as "\textit{Objective}" are not the only clues for consti-

\textsuperscript{1} At about this point Husserl inserted a page of text, which may be translated as follows.

Yet I, had to begin with myself, the Ego given in experience of myself as a man. After all, I could exercise reduction only by starting out from myself; and therefore I arrived only at the ego who has, as his worldly counterpart, his own psyche. My own human psyche, therefore, I can make evident as a manifestation of the absolute: What are others, what is the world, for me? — Constituted phenomena, merely something produced within me. Never can I reach the point of ascribing being in the absolute sense to others, any more than to the physical things of Nature, which exist only as transcendentally produced affairs. Meditations I–IV concern a first path, along which it becomes visible in a very general manner that, for the ego of the transcendental reduction, all that exists is and must be a constituted product. But must it not be said likewise that all that exists for me as a man must be constituted within me, in the manner peculiar to consciousness — including my own humanness? How is the latter proposition related to the former? Conscious life is likewise constituted necessarily as human in the constituted world, and as a human conscious life in which the world is intended, psychically constituted, and so forth.

The all-embracing constitution of the world within the ego is outlined as a problem only \textit{/} as far as the theory of clues — as far as the consideration of the world (that is to say: the ontological consideration thereof, as transformed into a constitutional-ontological consideration). Somewhere in that context, naturally, the problem man must present itself? But what is the proper order?

The first procedure in Meditations I–IV is to awaken the guiding thought: The world is a meaning, an accepted sense. When we go back to the ego, we can explicate the founding and founded strata with which that sense is built op [\textit{den Fundierungs-aufbau}], we can reach the absolute being and process in which the being of the world shows its ultimate truth and in which the ultimate problems of being reveal themselves — bringing into the thematic field all the disguises that unphilosophical naïveté cannot penetrate [\textit{alle Verhüllungen der unphilosophischen Naivität}].
tutional investigations — that is, when we inquire into the universal types of possible modes of consciousness of objects. The types of merely subjective objects, such as all immanent subjective processes themselves, are likewise clues, since, as objects of the consciousness of internal time, they have (singly and universally) their "constitution".

Everywhere problems of particular, separately considered kinds of objects and problems of universality become distinguishable. The latter concern the ego in the universality of his being and living and in his relation to the corresponding universality of his objective correlates. If we take the unitary Objective world as a transcendental clue, it leads back to the synthesis of Objective perceptions and other Objective intuitions, which extends throughout the unity of life as a whole, and is such that the world is at all times intended — and can become thematic — as a unit. Consequently the world is a universal problem of egology, as is likewise the whole of conscious life, in its immanent temporality, when we direct our regard to the purely immanent.

§ 22. The idea of the universal unity comprising all objects, and the task of clarifying it constitutionally.

Types of objects — viewed with the attitude established by phenomenological reduction, purely as cogitata, and not construed with the "prejudices" involved in a set of scientific concepts accepted in advance — were found to be clues for transcendental investigations, which belong together on account of their themes. The fact is that the constituting multiplicities of consciousness — those actually or possibly combined to make the unity of an identifying synthesis — are not accidental but, as regards the possibility / of such a synthesis, belong together for essential reasons. Accordingly they are governed by principles, thanks to which our phenomenological investigations do not get lost in disconnected descriptions but are essentially organized. Any "Objective" object, any object whatever (even an immanent one), points to a structure, within the transcendental ego, that is governed by a rule. As something the ego objectivates, something of which he is conscious in any manner, the object indicates forthwith a universal rule governing possible other
consciousnesses of it as identical — possible, as exemplifying essentially predelineated types. And naturally the same is true of any "imaginable" object, anything conceivable as something intended. Transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos of intentional processes. Moreover, it is not a chaos of types of constitution, each organized in itself by its relation to a kind or a form of intentional objects. In other words: The allness of objects and types of objects conceivable for me — transcendentally speaking: for me as transcendental ego — is no chaos; and correlatively the allness of the types of the infinite multiplicities, the types corresponding to types of objects, is not a chaos either: noetically and noematically those multiplicities always belong together, in respect of their possible synthesis.

That indicates in advance a universal constitutive synthesis, in which all syntheses function together in a definitely ordered manner and in which therefore all actual and possible objectivities (as actual and possible for the transcendental ego), and correlative all actual and possible modes of consciousness of them, are embraced. Furthermore we can say that an enormous task is foreshadowed, which is that of transcendental phenomenology as a whole: the task of carrying out all phenomenological investigations within the unity of a systematic and all-embracing order by following, as our mobile clue, a system to be found out level by level, the system namely of all objects of possible consciousness, including the system of their formal and material categories — the task, I say, of carrying out such investigations as corresponding constitutional investigations, one based upon another, and all of them interconnected, in a strictly systematic fashion.

But we speak more correctly if we say that here it is a matter of an infinite regulative idea, that the evidently presupposable system of possible objects of possible / consciousness is itself an anticipative idea (not however an invention, an "as if"), and that, as regards practice, it equips us with the principle for combining any relatively closed constitutional theory with any other: by an incessant uncovering of horizons — not only those belonging to objects of consciousness internally, but also those having an external reference, namely to essential forms of interconnexions. To be sure, even the tasks that present themselves
when we take single types of objects as restricted clues prove to be extremely complicated and always lead to extensive disciplines when we penetrate more deeply. That is the case, for example, with a transcendental theory of the constitution of a spatial object (to say nothing of a Nature) as such, of psychophysical being and humanity as such, culture as such.